Home > Society > Philosophy > Philosophy of Language > Meaning > Narrow Content
Normally, the content of a proposition is identified with its truth condition and the content of other conceptual entities, such as objects, are identified with those properties of the object that can make a contribution to the truth of predicates applied to it. Narrow content is that part of content that is wholly cognitive, rather than purely objective. Is there any such thing as narrow content? This is perhaps the hottest debate in the theory of meaning, and is at the heart of the current debate about intentionality.
http://www.trinity.edu/cbrown/papers/belstates&narcon.html
Article by Curtis Brown which argues that four plausible theses about belief and its relationship to narrow content are jointly inconsistent, and infers desiderata for a theory of narrow content in the light of this.
http://consc.net/mindpapers/2/all
Part two of six of an annotated bibliography on the philosophy of mind by David Chalmers.
http://consc.net/papers/content.html
Article by David Chalmers proposing an account of narrow content based upon a distinction between notional and relational content. Notional content allows us to describe the `subject-eye' view of the world, whilst relational content allows us to give observer independent analogues of notional content.
Home > Society > Philosophy > Philosophy of Language > Meaning > Narrow Content
Thanks to DMOZ, which built a great web directory for nearly two decades and freely shared it with the web. About us